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ABSTRACT

Johnson, Donald Dwight, III. M.A., Purdue University, December 2015. Communal
Division and Constitutional Changes in Colonial Fiji, 1959-1970. Major Professor:
Jennifer Foray.

This essay examines the role of communal division in changes to Fiji’s constitution
during the decade prior to Fiji becoming an independent state. Amicable relations
between indigenous Fijians and Indians who migrated under indentured servitude began
to crack in 1959 and broke open during political negotiations and the constitutional
conference of the 1965. The subsequent election in 1966 solidified the political gains of
fledgling parties and entrenched communal divides between the pro-Indian National
Federation Party and the Alliance Party, theoretically race neutral, representing the
interests of Fijians. By 1969 the political calculus of both the National Federation Party
and the Alliance Party shifted in favor of a bid for independence. However, to convince
London that Fiji was ready for self-governance, a demonstration of communal harmony
had to occur.

1

INTRODUCTION

Fijian High Chief Lala Sukuna often spoke of colonial Fiji as a three-legged stool
where indigenous Fijians contributed land, ethnic Indians contributed labor, and
Europeans contributed capital.1 Each leg of the stool remained isolated from the others
while contributing to the stability of the Fijian economy. However, the metaphoric stool
was never as stable as Sukuna characterized. In April 1959 an Australian expert, O. H. K.
Spate observed in a report to the British Governor of Fiji that “interracial relations are
remarkably good; but the equilibrium is unstable.”2 His words were prescient. The
equilibrium, upon which communal relations were based, rested on a continued
communal isolation that became more untenable. As the 1960’s wore on, inter-communal
conflict, especially between the Indian and Fijian communal groups, became an enduring
legacy of Fijian politics as Fiji transitioned from colonial rule to independence.
Fiji in the 1960’s offers an excellent opportunity to examine how constitutional
changes in legislative representation could encourage continued communal division
despite overt calls for national unity. The elections that resulted from change in
1

Lal, Brij V. In the Eye of the Storm: Jai Ram Reddy and the Politics of Postcolonial
Fiji. (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), 41. Throughout this essay ethnic Indians are
referred to as Indians. When references are made to citizens of India the difference is
clarified in the text.
2
O. H. K Spate. The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects: A Report. (Suva:
Government Press, 1959), 5. When Spate referred to “interracial relations,” he was using
the word race as it was used in government documents rather than as a comment on
biological differences.
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representation stimulated the growth of communally based political parties and charged
political negotiations. Political negotiations, especially in the lead up to the 1965
constitutional conference, were couched in terms of communal division by the
participants. Likewise, negotiations that led to Fijian independence were viewed through
a lens of communal division. This study focuses on Fiji from 1959 through 1970. It was
in 1959 that two major reports were completed analyzing the political situation in Fiji.
These reports posit that continued communal isolation was problematic and was holding
the colony back economically. Independence for Fiji in 1970 is a natural conclusion to
the period of study.
This essay analyzes inter-communal struggle in Fiji by examining efforts to
consolidate political power through constitutional changes in electoral methods and
representation in the Legislative Council in the 1960’s. By analyzing electoral procedures
and communal representation, I will argue that the British government of Fiji maintained
and encouraged manufactured communal identities. I will also argue that for pragmatic
reasons, these communal identities became self-reinforcing through the elections of 1963
and 1966 as political parties emerged under the auspices of representing separate
communities. The development of communal political parties, supported by electoral
results, buoyed party leadership in their efforts to consolidate further political power,
both within their respective communities and in the Fijian government. The struggle over
electoral methods and legislative representation in Fiji illustrates the impact that
constitutional negotiations can have in determining communal identities.

3
In 1643 Abel Tasmen, a Dutch navigator, became the first European to discover
the islands that became known as Fiji, located north of New Zealand and East of
Australia. However, Fiji would not be charted until 1840 when Charles Wilkes, a United
States Navy officer, created the first set of maps that showed the 332 islands.3 European
missionaries, specifically Wesleyans, arrived in Fiji and began the work of Christianizing
the Fijians in the 1830’s.4 By 1871 the European population, bolstered by Australian and
New Zealand settlers, reached 3,000. Economics, specifically the cotton and coconut
trade, overtook religious fervor in attracting European settlers.5 On October 10, 1874 Tui
Viti (King of Fiji) Cakobau and eleven other Fijian chiefs signed the Deed of Cession
granting sovereignty to the British Crown.6 Britain had resisted the offer of cession on
multiple occasions, beginning in 1858, but finally agreed to accept sovereignty over Fiji
when the need to protect British settlers overtook financial concerns of taking on another
colony.7 Europeans engaging in commercial activity collaborated with the Fijian chiefs
prior to cessions, however once Britain took control of Fiji the balance of power shifted
away from the chiefs to the Europeans.

3

Paris, Sheldon. "Abel Tasmen is Credited with the Discovery of Fiji." Stamps 252, no. 5
(Jul 29, 1995): 11. http://search.proquest.com/docview/220949960?accountid=13360.
Also, "Fiji." Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed November 20, 2015.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fj.html.
4
Brantlinger, Patrick. "Missionaries and Cannibals in Nineteenth‐century Fiji." History
and Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006): 21-38, 27.
5
Michael C. Howard, Fiji Race and Politics in an Island State. (Vancouver, B.C.: UBC
Press, 1991) 21.
6
Stephanie Lawson, "The Myth of Cultural Homogeneity and Its Implications for Chiefly
Power and Politics in Fiji." Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist. Comparative Studies in Society and
History 32, no. 4 (1990): 795-821, 799. Also W. David McIntyre. Winding up the British
Empire in the Pacific Islands. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 126.
7
David Routledge, "The Negotiations Leading to the Cession of Fiji, 1874." The Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History vol. 2, no. 3 (1974): 278-93, 278-279.
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Throughout the colonial period Fijian chiefs relied upon the Deed of Cession to
ensure continued “paramountcy” of Fijian interests.8 The first British Governor of Fiji,
Sir Arthur Gordon (1875-1880), instituted a form of indirect rule in which Fijians could
“progress at their own pace in their own traditional surroundings.”9 Gordon created two
separate administrations to govern Fiji, one for Europeans and another for Fijians.10
Gordon’s action unified the disparate Fijian tribes under a single bureaucracy, creating a
communal group where previously there had not been one. His land policies codified
Fijian communal ownership of more than eighty-three percent of Fiji.11 Communal land
ownership, along with tax policies that permitted taxes to be in kind instead of cash,
made it possible for subsistence farming in the Fijian community to continue into the
mid-twentieth century.12 Gordon intended his policies to last just long enough for Fijians
to develop in a way that would bring them into line with Europeans. However, the
colonial government he created in Fiji continued his policies and openly encouraged

8

In the Eye of the Storm, 67. To the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, paramountcy meant
that Fiji was to be for the Fijians and Fijian interests superseded all other interests. This
was especially so where Indian interests were at odds with Fijian, but it also applied to
European interests in theory.
9
“Gordon, Arthur Charles Hamilton, first Baron Stanmore (1829–1912),” Mark Francis
in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian
Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2011,
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33459 (accessed October 1, 2015). Also, Brij V
Lal, Islands of Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji. (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press,
2006) 2-3.
10
Fiji Race and Politics in an Island State, 24-25.
11
Islands of Turmoil, 2-3.
12
Ibid.
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isolation of Fijians, even advising tourists during the 1930’s, to avoid socializing with
Fijians.13
When Gordon arrived in Fiji, the islands were suffering economically. The cotton
market in Europe suffered a precipitous collapse in 1870 at the beginning of the FrancoPrussian war with the price of cotton in London falling by three fourths as cotton flooded
the markets.14 To help spur the Fijian economy Gordon reoriented commercial agriculture
towards the cultivation of sugar. He granted a monopoly to an Australian firm, the
Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSRC). Along with the monopoly Gordon approved
plans to institute indentured servitude to provide laborers on the sugar plantations
because he was “reluctant for the Fijians to be used for Western profiteering.”15
Beginning with the arrival of the ship Leonidas on March 4, 1879 and ending thirty-seven
years later, the CSRC transported 60,965 Indians to Fiji, the majority of whom came
from northern provinces although by the end of indenture recruitment shifted to the
southern provinces.16 Under the term of indentured servitude, Indians who served five
years were eligible to return to India at their own cost, or for an additional five years the
CSRC would cover the cost of the return trip. Despite the offer of return to India, the
majority of Indians who went to Fiji opted to remain in Fiji. To many of the Indians who
made the journey, Fiji represented a break from the rigid caste system of India, a place
13

Robert Norton. "Averting ‘Irresponsible Nationalism’: Political Origins of Ratu
Sukuna's Fijian Administration." The Journal of Pacific History 48, no. 4 (2013): 409428, 412-413.
14
Fiji Race and Politics in an Island State, 22.
15
Farzana Gounder, Indentured Identities: Resistance and Accommodation in PlantationEra Fiji (Philadelphia, PA, USA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011.) 21. For
further reading on the indentured servitude system within Fiji see Brij V. Lal, Chalo
Jahaji on a Journey through Indenture in Fiji. (Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2012)
16
Indentured Identities, 23.
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where people could make it based on their own merit and work ethic.17 The rapid rise in
the Indian population of Fiji threatened the hegemony of the indigenous Fijians.
In 1945 Governor Philip Mitchell (1942-1944) worked with Sukuna to transform
the Native Administration into a new system called the Fijian Administration.18 This new
administration was an effort by British administrators to mollify Fijian chiefs.19 Mitchell
feared that Fijians and Indians might begin collaborating together against the European
authority in Fiji. Fijian chiefs used the newly minted Fijian Administration to reinforce
their position of power within the Fijian community.20 This represented a retrenchment
into further isolation for the Fijian community at a time when the pace of decolonization
was increasing around the world. Despite official support for the Fijian Administration,
the British Governor of Fiji, Ronald Garvey (1952-1958), spoke about the importance of
national unity replacing communal divisions.21 Regardless of calls for national unity, the
colony maintained communal elections and a multiracial constitution. The decision to

17

The Fijian People, 5.
Philip Mitchell served as the Governor of Tanganyika prior to his posting in Fiji.
Following his post in Fiji, Mitchell served as the Governor of Kenya. “Mitchell, Sir
Philip Euen (1890–1964),” D. W. Throup in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed.
Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35045
(accessed November 22, 2015).
19
Robert Norton, "‘A Pre-eminent Right to Political Rule’:1 Indigenous Fijian Power and
Multi-ethnic Nation Building." Round Table 101, no. 6 (December 2012): 521-535, 523.
20
Robert Norton, "Accommodating Indigenous Privilege: Britain's Dilemma in
Decolonising Fiji." The Journal of Pacific History, 37, no. 2 (2002): 133-56, 135.
21
"Accommodating Indigenous Privilege, 135. Also, “Colonial administrators and postindependence leaders in Fiji (1875–2000),” Alex May in Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography, eee online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Oxford: OUP, October 2005; online
ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/93236
(accessed November 22, 2015).
18
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maintain a multiracial constitution and communal elections is reminiscent of decisions by
the British Colonial Office across the empire as colonies approached independence.
Many scholars have examined multiracial representation in British colonial
legislative bodies. This is especially true for African colonies approaching independence.
Although Ronald Aminzade’s Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa is a
general history of race and nationalism in Tanzania, he addresses racial based voting in
Tanganyika before independence.22 Robert Maxon’s Britain and Kenya’s Constitutions,
1950–1960 is an excellent work that demonstrates the unpredictable nature of
constitutional changes.23 Kenya’s independence in 1963 brought with it a change to nonracially based voting that Kenyan political leaders lobbied London for throughout the
1950’s. The unifying theme in Kenya and Tanganyika, both of which gained
independence shortly before Fiji, was a call for changes to their respective constitutions
to permit non-communally based voting. While these works address communally based
voting schemes, this essay contributes by analyzing changes in the context of a colony
consisting of a minority indigenous population with special privileges and a nonindigenous majority population with limited rights. Focusing on Fiji provides opportunity
to analyze communally based voting in terms of minority rights instead of strictly settler
rights. Additionally, when Kenya and Tanganyika obtained independence, communally
based voting was cast aside whereas in Fiji, communally based voting was retained.

22

Ronald Aminzade. Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of
Tanzania. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
23
Robert M.Maxon, Britain and Kenya's Constitutions, 1950-1960. (Amherst, N.Y.:
Cambria Press, 2011).

8
Traditionally, historians of Fiji have viewed societal ills in terms of “the nature of
Fiji’s plural society.”24 However, some scholars have undertaken an effort to more
accurately describe group identities.25 Stacey-Ann Wilson argues for examining Fijian
communal groups in terms of ethnicity rather than race. She points out that both race and
ethnicity are potentially problematic in the case of Fiji since each of the communal
groups are composed of multiple sub “ethnocultures.” Indians in Fiji were not monolithic,
especially in terms of religion (Hindu, Christian, Muslim, and Sikh). Similarly, Fijians as
a communal group were “regionally differentiated.”26 Despite numerous sub-cultural
differentiations within each communal group, the Fijian constitution identified
representation based on broad categorization. Because of the way in which the
communally based Fijian electoral system was designed, self-identity and differentiation
within each communal group, while important to each individual, was relegated in favor
of political unity within a given communal group for purposes of electoral politics.
Certainly, each communal election entailed candidates differentiating themselves from
their opponents, but the nature of communal representation reduced the potential impact
of internal disputes.

24

Stephanie Lawson. "Constitutional Change in Fiji: The Apparatus of Justification."
Ethnic and Racial Studies. vol. 15, no. 1 (1992): 61-84, 61.
25
Scholars have accomplished much of the scholarly work in racial and ethnic identity.
Some examples include: Michael Omi, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the
United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986)
also David John Howard. Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican
Republic. (Oxford, U.K.: Signal Books, 2001) and also Omi, Michael, and Howard
Winant. 2008. “Once More, with Feeling: Reflections on Racial Formation”. PMLA 123
(5). Modern Language Association: 1565–72.
26
Stacey Wilson. Politics of Identity in Small Plural Societies Guyana, the Fiji Islands,
and Trinidad and Tobago. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 17, 103.

9
In recent years, many historians that study Fiji have focused their attention on the
military coups of the 1980s. It was only seventeen years after independence that the first
coup took place in Fiji. Typically, analysis of the military coups begin with a brief
discussion of the Deed of Cession and then skip over to consideration of the lasting
impact of the 1970 constitution.27 This essay does not analyze post-colonial communal
relations, but it does contribute to that analysis by beginning eleven years prior than what
is typical. By beginning analysis of the relationship between Legislative representation
and communal division in 1959, this essay shifts traditional analysis and sets that study
on a more firm foundation.
The first section of this essay analyzes the two major reports commissioned by the
British Governor of Fiji and published as Legislative Council papers along with a
classified report Professor Spate submitted to the Colonial Office. These three reports
provided a foundation for the political change that occurs throughout the 1960’s
including the first election after Fijians obtain the franchise in 1963. The second section
illustrates how communally based negotiations leading up to and at the constitutional
conference of 1965 and the results of the subsequent elections of 1966 reinforced
communal identity. In the last section I will demonstrate that communal division between
Fijians and Indians could be concealed when the political aims of the political parties

27

Brij Lal, A Time Bomb Lies Buried Fiji's Road to Independence, 1960-1970. (Canberra,
A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2008). Also, Deryck Scarr. Fiji: Politics of Illusion, the Military
Coups in Fiji. (Kensington, NSW, Australia: New South Wales University Press, 1988).
Also, Ghai, Yash, and Jill Cottrell. "A Tale of Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and Politics
in Fiji." International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 639 (2007). Also, Susanna
Trnka. State of Suffering Political Violence and Community Survival in Fiji. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2008).
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representing the two communities coincided. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that
communal identities and divisions were reinforced through the process of changing the
method of selecting legislative representation in Fiji.

11

CHAPTER 1. COMMUNAL ISOLATION AND THE EXPANSION OF
COMMUNAL DIVISION

Sir Kenneth Maddocks, the British Governor of Fiji, commissioned two studies
on the situation of Fiji in 1959. O. H. K. Spate, Professor of Geography at the
Australian National University, crafted a report on The Fijian People: Economic
Problems and Prospects on April 9, 1959, published as Council Paper No. 13 of 1959
by the Government Press in Suva.28 Less than a year later the Government Press
published the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and
Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji, 1959 in May of 1960.29 Sir Alan Burns, the
former British Governor of Nigeria, led this effort, colloquially known as the Burns
Commission.30 Combined, these reports demonstrated that the existing political
balance along communal lines was increasingly tenuous. Spate’s commentary
asserted that the social situation in the Fijian community was restraining economic
development. The Burns Commission called into question the viability of maintaining
a separate administration for Fijians. Both reports focused mostly on indigenous
Fijians, however the increasing interactions between Fijians and Indians threatened

28

The Fijian People. Spate authored a second report, The Fijian Political Scene:
Some Reflections. This report, however, was submitted to the Colonial Office and
held as confidential until 1989. R. G. Ward and O. H. K. Spate. "Thirty Years Ago: A
View of the Fijian Political Scene Confidential Report to the British Colonial Office,
September 1959." The Journal of Pacific History: 103-24. 103.
29
Report of the Commission of Enquiry.
30
Ibid, 1.
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the precarious balancing act that had kept Fiji relatively balanced throughout the early
twentieth century.
Concerns regarding demographics and land ownership illustrated clear
differences in opportunity for the people of both the Fijian and Indian communities,
but the clearest differences in opportunity were in governmental administration. The
make-up of the Legislative Council, the only representational body in the colonial
administration that accounted for all people in Fiji, offered opportunity along
communally based lines. While the Legislative Council represented all people, the
Fijian Administration existed strictly for Fijians, leaving out both Europeans and
Indians. Support for the Fijian Administration was strong with Fijian Chiefs, as it
bolstered their position within the Fijian community, but the practical result of the
Fijian Administration was continued isolation of the Fijian community. Both Spate
and the Burns Commission denounced The Fijian Administration for the impact it had
in advancing communal division at a time when the British colonial government
called for national unity.
Spate relayed that in his opinion, although relations between Fijians, Indians,
and Europeans were amicable in daily interactions, the political future of Fiji was
“gloomy.”31 The gloom that Spate predicted related to the divisions between the
communities that were largely predicated on isolation. Each community had its own
challenges to overcome for unity to occur. He began by addressing what he termed
the “Indian challenge.”32 In the first place, the Indian population exceeded the Fijian
and European populaces. Spate called attention to the fact that the Fijians operated
31
32

“Thirty Years Ago,” 104.
Ibid, 105.
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under a “quasi-autonomous administration” while the numerically smaller European
population possessed “political strength out of all proportion to its numbers by virtue
of the political arithmetic of 'parity' in Legco.”33 When the 1959 Annual Report was
compiled, Fijians comprised 41.9 percent of the population, while Indians comprised
49.4 percent of the population. Europeans, including Part-Europeans, were just 4.7
percent. This equated to legislative representation of one member per 33,800 Indians,
29,600 Fijians, and 1,280 Europeans.34 Despite political inequity between the racial
groups, a concerted effort was made to deny the existence of “racial disharmony.”35
Spate argued for public acknowledgement of communal division and
associated problems.
“One can hold back for a long time a numerical majority possessed of little
education and economic strength; for a shorter time, and with more difficulty,
a minority possessed of these; but a numerical majority (emphasis in the
original) increasingly strong economically and with educated middle-class
leaders cannot permanently be denied equivalent political strength except by
sheer force — and even that may be, probably will be, too costly. The only
thing to do is to try at least to find some way to exorcise and canalise its
demands in advance; but nothing, surely, can be more disastrous than to refuse
to admit (in public) the existence of a racial problem, while at the same time
exacerbating it by constant pinpricks at the expense of the majority
community. Yet such in effect seems to be the 'policy' of the more influential
European and Fijian leaders, and that is why the situation, beneath the surface,
is so frightening.”36
Spate contended that the growing dissatisfaction in the Indian population would
eventually force its way to the surface regardless of attempts to marginalize concerns.
The unofficial policy, antagonizing the Indian population while denying the existence
of inequity in communal divisions, of what Spate considered “influential European
33

Ibid. LegCo is a shortened term for the Legislative Council.
Fiji: Report for the Year 1958, 125.
35
“Thirty Years Ago,” 105.
36
Ibid
34
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and Fijian leaders” was only exacerbating divisions. Regardless of the desires of the
European and Fijian leadership the “racial problem” existed, and Spate argued that
the best course of action was public admission by leaders in Fiji. The publication of
his report to the Governor contributed to public acknowledgement of the divide,
though his argument here was for a change in public policies related to the communal
divide.
Communal relations were generally split along Fijian and Indian lines with
Europeans typically aligning with Fijians in terms of public policy. The effects of
policies, such as land purchase restrictions and Fijian Administration, enacted by the
colonial government had disparate impacts on different groups. Spate indicated that
the European population was able to adapt to cultural issues in Fiji because they were
fewer in number and, in general, had the resources needed to adjust.37 If the European
population was capable of adapting to cultural transformation because of greater
resources and fewer numbers, it stands to reason that the Fijian and Indian
populations were viewed as less capable of adjusting to cultural adaptation. Although
he viewed communal relations as “extraordinarily good,” Spate cautioned that the
reason for those good relations was that the competing Indian and Fijian cultures
were operating side by side with little intersection.38 Despite apparently good
relations in 1959, communal groups remained isolated in Fiji, and projected increases
in populations meant that those cultures would begin to intersect and conflict more
often.

37
38

Ibid, 116.
Ibid.
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The Indian population increased from 588 in 1881 to 60,634 in 1921 (an
increase of 1,031%). While the Indian population expanded quickly through
indentured servitude, the Fijian population declined. The Fijian population fell
precipitously from 114,748 in 1881 to 84,475 in 1921 (a decrease of 26%).39 The
Indian population continued rapid growth, exceeding the growth of the Fijian
population. By the conclusion of 1959, Indians in Fiji totaled 191,328, approximately
49 percent of the total population. By comparison, the Fijian population numbered
162,483, approximately 42 percent of the total population. The remaining population
was split among European, Part-European, Chinese, and Other Pacific Races.40 Fiji
boasted both a higher birth rate and a low mortality rate, compared with developed
countries. The birthrate per 1,000 for Indians was 47.4 in 1959 compared to the Fijian
birthrate of 36.9.41 These birthrates were typical of the years surrounding 1959.42 If
the status quo was retained the Indian population was expected to become a dominant
majority in Fiji. Even though the Indian community possessed numerical dominance
in the population, the Fijian community possessed dominance in the key area of land
ownership.
Land ownership and usage was aligned with communal division from the
signing of the Deed of Cession. The principles, which guided land use and ownership,
were derived Paragraph 4 from the Deed of Cession:
“That the absolute proprietorship of all lands not shown to be alienated so as
to have become bona fide the property of Europeans or other foreigners or not
39

Ibid.
Fiji: Report for the Year 1959, 9.
41
Fiji: Report for the Year 1959, 126. Also, Fiji: Report for the Year 1960, 125.
42
Fiji: Report for the Year 1960, 125. Fiji: Report for the Year 1961, 132. Also, Fiji:
Report for the Year 1958, 111.
40
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now in the actual use or occupation of some Chief or tribe or not actually
required for the probable future support and maintenance of some chief or
tribe shall be and is hereby declared to be vested in Her said Majesty her heirs
and successors.”43
This limited opportunity to own land for anyone who did not already own land in Fiji
after 1874. By the beginning of 1960, land distribution heavily favored the Native
Customary Tenure. Thus, Fijians, as a communal group, possessed 83.6% of the total
landmass of Fiji. Crown Land consisted of 6.4% of the landmass. Freehold Land,
individually titled landowners, consisted of 10%. Despite being a plurality of the
population, individual Indian landowners possessed just 1.7%.44 The official policies
of the colonial government restricting land ownership forced individuals into
communal identities. All Fijians, regardless of which island or tribe they were from,
owned the land together. Similarly, Indians were frozen out of the land market with
very few exceptions. Despite significant internal differentiation within communal
groups, land policy recognized only communal identity.
Burns observed that the “Land Problem” rested mostly in the poor usage of
agriculturally viable land in Fiji. Freehold land, privately held land sold by Fijians to
Europeans before Cession in 1874, was not available to small farmers and some of it
was not being used. The British government owned Crown land. Fijians communally
owned all land other than freehold land and Crown land. In the estimation of the
members of the Burns Commission, Fijians failed to adequately utilize the

43

Joeli Baledrokadroka, “The Fijian Understanding of the Deed of Cession Treaty of
1874”. Appendix A. Conference paper presented at Traditional Lands in the Pacific
Region: Indigenous Common Property Resources in Convulsion or Cohesion,
Brisbane, Australia (September 7-9 2003)
44
Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 19.
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communally owned land.45 Notwithstanding communal ownership of the vast
majority of land across the island group, the Fijian lands were actually at a distinct
disadvantage compared to Crown land, since much of the land was not agriculturally
viable. Of 2,611,548 acres on Viti Levu, the largest island in Fiji, 1,645,500 acres
were considered to be useless for agricultural purposes. Only 280,866 acres,
approximately eleven percent, were considered arable, cultivatable land.46 Vanua
Levu, the second largest Fijian island, was only slightly better with thirteen percent
considered arable, cultivatable land.47 Thus, despite having the advantage of
possessing the vast majority of land in Fiji, usable land only represented a small
portion of these holdings. Owning land was different than possessing rights to work
the land. The Indian population held the majority of leases on arable land.48
Individual Indians possessed leases for 350,000 acres across Fiji, with 222,000 acres
within the “cane belts,” in 1959.49 By obtaining leases, individuals overcame the
communal disadvantage of being prohibited from owning land. The right to own land
was a significant economic factor, but it was also a significant political issue that split
along communal lines. Any attempt to alter government policies related to land tenure
and ownership along communal lines would have to start at the Legislative Council.
The Legislative Council consisted of sixteen official members, including the
Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, and Finance Secretary in an ex officio capacity.
Additionally, there were fifteen “unofficial” members of the Legislative Council; five
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Fijians, five Indians, and five Europeans. It was through the “unofficials,” members
of the council without a portfolio, that the inhabitants of Fiji were directly represented
in the colonial government. Selection to the council was dependent upon communal
category. Three Indian and three European “unofficials” were elected every third year
with the remaining representatives being nominated. Indians obtained franchise, over
the objections to the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, in 1929, although the first elected
Indians boycotted from 1929-1932 in protest for not having equality with the
European members.50 The Great Council of Chiefs submitted a slate of between seven
and ten Fijian “unofficials” to the Governor. The Governor then selected five of the
nominated Fijians.51 Differentiated methods for selecting representatives in the
Legislative Council varied based on communal group and illustrated significant
distinctions between the communities. Unofficials in the Legislative Council
represented whole communal groups regardless of internal differentiation.
The hierarchy and traditions of Fijian culture made it difficult for Fijians to
freely interact with their representatives. One Fijian expressed, “These representatives
are to deliver in the Legislative Council what the people cannot tell the chiefs who are
the present members and who are government officials and according to our Fijian
customs it is not easy to discuss things freely with them.”52 To address the disparity
between the directed representation of Fijians and the direct representation of Indians
and Europeans, the Burns Commission recommended that instead of the Great
Council of Chiefs nominating all five seats, they should nominate two with the
50
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remaining seats selected through direct elections.53 Removing the responsibility of the
Great Council of Chiefs to nominate the full slate of Fijian representation in favor of
direct representation was a threat to homogeneity of the Fijian communal group.
More significantly, it was a threat to the power of the chiefs. It would mark a
significant shift in the Fijian culture.
Whereas the Legislative Council represented the three primary racial
categories in Fiji, the Fijian Administration existed solely for the purpose of
supporting Fijians. The Fijian Administration was supposed to act as “a local
government system,” but the Burns Commission noted, “There is little local
(emphasis in original) government as the provincial officers are largely controlled
from headquarters where there is a ‘Central Fijian Treasury’. Where the population is
mixed the administration is entirely racial, and not local, as it deals only with
Fijians.”54 The commission concluded that “in a colony of this size a double
administration is wasteful of man-power and money, and we believe that the wellbeing of the Fijians could safely be left in the care of the District Officers.”55 While
the commission concluded that the dual administration should be abolished, they were
also careful to articulate that it should be abolished gradually, “pending the
introduction of local government.”56 The Burns Commission believed that since the
Fijian Administration had an isolating effect on the Fijian community, an effort to
abolish it immediately might serve to further isolate the community through fear of
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losing cultural identity. Replacing the Fijian Administration with local government
would remove the communal aspect of the existing administration by including the
Indian community within the responsibility of the local government.
The Fijian communal system represented a significant difficulty in moving the
colony to adopt a new form of local government rather than the existing Fijian
Administration. The communal system required Fijians to observe multiple traditional
obligations that included the “planting and upkeep of food crops.”57 Despite the Fijian
Administration’s control over communal life, Spate observed “the natural direction of
growth is towards individualism; and from many talks with Fijians both in the koro
and the towns, I feel assured that it is increasingly the direction desired by the people:
most notably on Viti Levu, but, even if to a lesser extent, also in the islands.”58 The
communal responsibilities levied on Fijians contributed to a decreased ability to
contribute to individual economic success since an individual may be obligated to
perform communal duties at economically pivotal times such as “planting or reaping
his crop.”59 Communal responsibilities, enforced by the Fijian Administration,
reinforced the isolation of the Fijian community.
Early in his report, Spate illustrated the political difficulties implicit with the
Fijian Administration. He posited that the existence of a separate administration
dedicated to the advancement of Fijians by its very nature, tended to maintain “racial
separatism.”60 Any efforts undertaken to reduce the policing and regulatory powers of
the Administration would likely cause a significant amount of consternation amongst
57
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the Fijian population. Specifically, Spate cautioned, a direct assault on the
administration from the outside would likely be countered by a rush to defend it.61
The Spate and Burns Commission reports exposed the fragility of the communal
divide in Fiji. Spate’s prediction of backlash against calls to dissolve the Fijian
Administration proved to be correct.
Both the Burns Commission and Spate reports recommended reducing, and
eventually eliminating, the Fijian Administration in 1959, however, F.J. West, a
Senior Fellow in Pacific History at Australia National University, recommended
against the dissolution of the Fijian Administration. Although West argued for
maintaining the Fijian Administration, he conceded that, “Too often the purpose
which Sukuna had in mind for the Fijian Administration shades off into another:
preservation of the status quo.”62 Even a scholar committed to keeping the Fijian
Administration understood that it meant retaining Fijian isolation. Despite the
observations of Alan Burns, a Colonial Office veteran and former colonial
administrator, that the Fijian Administration exacerbated communal division in Fiji,
(Harold) Julian Amery, Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, rejected the negative
implications of the administration in November of 1960 saying, “I see no future in the

61

Ibid, 108.
Ratu Josefa Lalabalavu Vaanialialia Sukuna was the chief of Lau and held position
in the civil service in Fiji in the early twentieth century. He was a proponent of the
Fijian Administration and was well known for his advocacy of maintaining Fijian
primacy in political affairs. West, Francis James. Political Advancement in the South
Pacific: A Comparative Study of Colonial Practice in Fiji, Tahiti, and American
Samoa. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1961, 44. Also “Sukuna, Josefa
Lalabalavu Vaanialialia (1888–1958),” I. C. Campbell in Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP,
2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, October 2008,
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53278 (accessed November 5, 2015).
62

22
Burns recommendation that the Fijian administration should be wound up as soon as
possible.”63 Amery went beyond simply rejecting the eventual abolishment of the
Fijian Administration. He stated, “I would personally be inclined to go further and
encourage the development of some Indian counterpart to the Fijian
administration.”64 His purpose in recommending a separate administration was to
recognize the separate natures of the Indian and Fijian cultures since, as he saw it, the
differences between Indians and Fijians were more dissimilar than those of Jews and
Arabs.65 He accused the Burns Commission of aggravating tensions between
communities with their recommendations.66 Amery thought that the dissolution of
communal isolation was the key to aggravating tensions, and he was in a position to
ensure policies that encouraged isolation were maintained.
Ravuama Vunivalu, a Fijian Legislative Council member, slammed the Burns
Commission report as an assault on the “Fijian way of life,” and that the position of
Fijians “in the Colony was not as invulnerable as they had hoped it to be.”67 Vunivalu
expressed concern that Fijian control over the colony might be fading as Indian
political power seemed to be rising. The situation in Fiji was summed up in an
editorial On March 15, 1960 in the Times of London, which stated, “To-day Indians
control most of the sugar cane production and form exactly half of the population.
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The Fijians themselves make up only two-fifths of the population. They are generally
less advanced, both economically and politically (Indians have the vote, Fijians have
their representatives in the Legislative Council chosen for them by the Chiefs), but
they own the land which the Indians need.”68 The Indian population appeared to have
overtaken the Fijian community demographically, economically, and politically.
What remained uniquely Fijian were the land and the Fijian Administration.
Regardless of Amery’s desires, Fiji was no longer capable of remaining communally
isolated without relations between communities deteriorating.
The reality of rising tensions between Fijians and Indians could not be ignored
in perpetuity. On December 31, 1961, an article titled "Fiji Independence Demand,"
buried on page ten, concerned the future of Fiji. The increased emphasis on
independence for colonies was not lost on Fiji’s political leadership. Fijian Paramount
Chief Cakobau, a direct descendent of Tui Viti Cakobau, demanded that when
independence came to Fiji, the British government ought to return the island group to
the Fijian people. Indian leaders in Fiji objected to this demand. The brief article in
the Times made only a passing reference at the end of the article illustrating the
growing tension; “Both the Fijians and Indians have five members of the Legislative
Council. There have been some sharp exchanges between them recently.”69 The
members of the communally selected Legislative Council represented distinct
communities. Regardless of political ideology, each representative argued on behalf
of communal concern, and those concerns had become sharp.
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The make-up of the Legislative Council was altered in 1963. Whereas prior to
elections in early 1963 there were fifteen members split up by communal group,
following the elections the size and purpose of the Legislative Council had shifted
significantly. The Legislative Council expanded in size to thirty-seven members
including nineteen ex-officio members, four elected Europeans, two nominated
Europeans, four elected Fijians, two nominated Fijians by the Great Council of Chiefs,
four elected Indians, and two nominated Indians.70 More important than changes in
the structure of the Legislative Council was the election itself. While elections
remained communal, the April elections denoted the first time that Fijians were given
the opportunity to directly vote for their representatives.71
Turn out significantly increased in the 1963 elections with 59,895 votes cast
compared to just 13,356 votes in 1959.72 While this increase in voters may have
represented a move towards more inclusive representation of Fijians who went to the
polls for the first time, the communal nature of voting meant that the representative to
represented ratio remained inherently unequal.73 The essential difference in 1963, at
least for the Fijian population, was the method of selecting representatives in addition
to the expanded number of representatives for each communal group in the
Legislative Council. The Fijian franchise was a major shift in the internal Fijian
relations with the government. Individual Fijians now had a say in governance
outside of the hierarchy of the Great Council of Chiefs.
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Because the election remained communally based, the candidates running for
office were only concerned with attracting the votes of those within their communal
group. As a result, the campaign in 1963 illustrated the continued isolation of
everyday life for Fijians and Indians. According to Norman Meller and James
Anthony, the Indian candidates tended to focus on “such issues as free medical
treatment, housing, higher wages, or social security, pensions, and destitute
allowances,” whereas these concerns were largely absent from the Fijian campaigns.74
Meller and Anthony attributed this to “the distinction between Indian individualized
life and Fijian communal living.”75 The campaigns showed Indian identity was based
on individual merit and success, thus a concern for social welfare emanating from the
state rather than from pre-existing communal structures. This was a marked
difference from the Fijian community that was still steeped in communal
responsibility that came from community rather than from the state.
The campaigns shed light on ongoing inter-communal relations as well. Most
of the campaign statements made by Fijian candidates contained explicit pro-Fijian
sentiment without explicitly stating an anti-Indian bias. Both Fijian and Indian
candidates expressed support for “one-nationism,” although the phrase had
significantly different practical meaning depending on who was using the phrase. 76
To Indians, as the majority population, “one-nationism” meant legal equality with
Fijians and likely control over the political system in Fiji. For the Fijian candidates,
“one-nationism” was combined with a pro-Fijian sentiment meant to exclude Indians
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from the political and legal system of Fiji. Thus, the campaigns of 1963 demonstrated
that nature of the electoral system was continuing to isolate the populations into
communal groups. Campaign rhetoric demonstrated that communal division was an
important political issue in Fiji even though voters remained isolated within
communal voting groups.
The political aftermath of the 1963 elections was most evident in Indian
politics. Citizens Federation, a loose collection of local Indian political parties
throughout Fiji, performed well in the 1963 elections capturing all three elected,
communal Indian seats in the Legislative Council. The Federation Party developed
from the Citizens Federation and adopted a formal constitution on June 21, 1964 and
became Fiji’s first official colony-wide political party.77 Siddiq Koya, one of the three
elected Indians, drafted the constitution. Upon adoption, A.D. Patel was elected as the
first president of the party, and Koya was elected to be the first vice-president.78 The
Federation succeeded in dominating Indian politics in Fiji although the population it
claimed to represent was much more diverse than the party recognized. Despite
internecine political struggle, the Federation parlayed election results to ensure that
the party’s definition of Indian concerns was represented to the governments in Suva
and London as the Indian perspective. Thus, the Federation subsumed Indian political
identity.
The Federation operated as the sole colony wide political party in Fiji until
1966 when the Alliance Party was created. Similar to the founding of the Federation,
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the Alliance emerged from a collection of existing local political parties and was
officially formed on March 14, 1966 with Ratu Mara as the first party leader. The
Alliance billed itself as a multiracial political party despite the generally recognized
purpose of representing Fijian interests.79 The Fijian Administration and the Great
Council of Chiefs encouraged Fijian isolation through cultural and structural methods.
The Alliance emerged to confront the growing political threat of the Federation and in
doing so it subsumed Fijian political identity.
Professor Spate and the members of the Burns Commission submitted reports
that clearly laid out the economic situation in Fiji at the end of the 1950’s, but more
than just commenting on the economy, the reports illustrated the communal isolation
of Fiji, especially in the Indian and Fijian communities. The most controversial aspect
of the Burns report, recommendations regarding the eventual dissolution the Fijian
Administration, was supported by Spate. The Undersecretary of State, Amery, who
supported continued communal isolation in Fiji, rejected this recommendation.
Despite continuing policies of communal isolation, the British colonial government
gave the Fijian community the franchise in 1963. The elections of 1963 remained
communal affairs as voters went to the polls to vote for representatives of their
respective communal groups. The campaigns focused on internal political debates,
but the results of the election had a significant impact on the communal identity as
Fijian and Indian communal politics as political parties emerged from the chaos of the
first Fijian election. Elections in 1963 were a turning point for Fiji’s isolated
communal systems. Direct, communal representation brought Fijians into conflict
79
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with Indians. Political negotiations between the communal groups were altered as
Fijians had a voice in who represented them. This is especially evident in the
negotiations surrounding and at the constitutional conference of 1965 in London.

29

CHAPTER 2. REINFORCING COMMUNAL DIVISION AND POLITICAL
IDENTITY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Shortly after the elections of 1963 preparations began for a constitutional
conference. According to the Annual Report for 1965, “The purpose of the conference
was to work out a constitutional framework for Fiji which would preserve a
continuing link with Britain and within which further progress could be make in the
direction of internal self-government.”80 Internal self-government was Great Britain’s
eventual goal for Fiji, though not one that came with a timeline.81 Before the
conference opened on July 26, 1965, various issues had to be ironed out.82 Some of
these issues included discussion about full independence for Fiji, who would be
invited, and whether or not representation in the Legislative Council would remain
communally based.
The topic of independence from Great Britain, fully supported by Federation
representatives and fully rejected by the Fijian and European representatives, was
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tabled in advance of the conference.83 The official report out of the conference
stipulated a “general agreement had been reached in Fiji that independence was not
an issue to be discussed.”84 Internal self-governance, distinct from independence,
remained a primary purpose for the conference. Fijians viewed self-governance as
Fijians controlling Fiji, employing the Deed of Cession to support this view. Apisai
Tora, a Fijian politician argued that since it was Fijians, not Indians, who signed the
Deed of Cession only Fijians should be invited to the Constitutional Conference in
London.85 The Colonial Office rejected this argument in favor of including Indians.
The British Governor of Fiji, Sir Derek Jakeway initially recommended that
each racial community nominate representatives for the 1965 conference.86 The Fijian
delegation was not adverse to this recommendation. However, issues arose when the
Indian delegation nominated only members of the Federation Party. Jakeway balked
at the exclusion of Indians not aligned with the Federation based on the belief that the
Federation did not adequately represent all Indians in Fiji.87 He proposed a change to
the process of selecting representatives where the “unofficial” members of the
Legislative Council would select delegates for the conference. Patel strenuously
objected to the Legislative Council selecting delegates on the grounds that selection
of communally aligned delegates by members of other groups was tantamount to
interference in the internal affairs of each group.88 This argument was a bit
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disingenuous given the Federation stance of supporting common rolls for electing
legislative representatives. The Federation leadership had won the communal seats
and was consolidating Indian support within the political party and sole
representation on behalf of Indians would further coalesce Indian political identity
within the party. Regardless of the motivations behind Patel’s objections, Whitehall
intervened in the negotiations and forced Jakeway to relent. The Federation’s
objections resulted in invitations being extended to all of the elected, “unofficials” of
the Legislative Council. 89
Voting method was a key issue for those representatives who would attend the
constitutional conference in London. There were two competing methods for
selecting representatives in an election. Communal roll voting was the status quo. In a
communal roll situation each voter is asked to choose their preferred candidate from a
list that only includes members of the same racial, or communal, group. Thus, in Fiji
a Fijian voted only for Fijians, and Indians were only permitted to vote for Indians.
Communal roll voting also means a guaranteed allocation of elected officials
according to racial community. In general, the Fijian leadership supported the
continuation of the communal roll voting system. Indian leadership generally backed
a common roll scheme for Fiji, although the community was split on whether to
support a communal roll voting or common roll voting scheme.90 Common roll voting
is a method where voters are able to select their preferred candidate from a list
regardless of the race of the voter or candidate. Using a straight common roll does not
guarantee an allocation of seats according to racial community. In a racially divided
89
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Fiji, the Fijian political leaders, such as Apisai Tora and Ratu Mara, believed that a
common roll voting system would lead to an Indian dominated Legislative Council.
Maintaining communal roll voting was in the interest of both Fijians and
Europeans because of the numerical disparity with the Indian community. By 1965
the Indian population had gone from being a plurality of the total population in Fiji to
being the majority with 50.08% of the population. By comparison, the Fijian
community was just 41.49% of the population, and Europeans totaled just 2.29%.91 It
is, therefore, not surprising that the Fijian and European communities would
encourage the continued use of communal roll voting, thereby increasing their per
citizen representation. In 1965, the communal representation system meant that there
was one elected representative for 58,835 Indians, 48,750 Fijians, and 2,689
Europeans.92 With birthrates projected to remain stable, the imbalance of
representation appeared likely to grow.
It is hardly surprising that the Federation leadership supported common roll
voting for Legislative Council elections. Granting each adult in Fiji a vote that could
be cast on behalf of any candidate would theoretically curtail the over-representation
of Fijians and Europeans and would almost certainly favor the Indian community. In
Spate’s 1959 report, he observed, “The more a common representation is postponed
(and in this age it probably cannot be postponed for ever), the weaker is the Fijian
share (emphasis in original), and the less they can learn of how to use the share they
have.”93 The concept of common roll voting may have been the most equitable in
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terms of representative to constituent ratios, and in some quarters it was viewed to be
inevitable eventually, but it was an untenable solution in 1965.94
Adoption of common roll voting in Fiji was an essential part of the Federation
platform. A.D. Patel outlined his reasons for adopting common roll voting. He argued
that common rolls were a way to create unity in Fiji, had been successful in the
African colonies, and would pressure the people into acting along political lines
rather than racial lines. Patel decried communal rolls as inevitably dividing people,
limiting the ability of representatives to compromise in the best interest of the nation,
and exacerbating communal differences.95
Despite the passionate advocacy of Patel and the Federation, Fijian and
European political leadership in Fiji rejected common roll voting in favor of
continued communal roll voting. Even though the Fijian population lacked a unified
political party to face off against the Federation, the existing parties that represented
Fijian interests acted in a unified way. This would not have been likely under a
common roll system. The political fracturing of the various parties would likely have
assisted the Federation. If Indian proposals related to common roll were realized,
Fijians feared that they would lose the ability to maintain their place in society since
the numerically superior Indians would have the majority of the representation in the
Legislative Council.96 The anti-common roll sentiment was summed up in a Fijian
phrase, “E na vula se na balabala,”: “We will have common roll when the balabala
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flowers.”97 A balabala, a tree fern, does not flower.98 Patel referred to this notion as
exacerbating communal suspicions and anxiety.
In March 1965, Governor Jakeway provided the Federation reason for further
suspicion and anxiety when he said, “I thought it was common ground that the Fijian
people – the autochthonous people – have a special position in Fiji because they
belonged here first, long before anyone else came here. It was inconceivable that
Britain would ever permit the Fijian people to be placed politically under the heels of
an immigrant community.”99 According to the Governor, the British position mirrored
that of the Fijian politicians. The Governor’s comments seemed to confirm Federation
leaders suspicions that negotiations were useless. On 25 April 1965, the Federation
Party voted to withdraw from informal talks in Fiji. The Fiji Times was publishing
supposedly confidential conversations from the negotiations. The Federation put out a
statement accusing the Fiji Times, the Public Relations Office, and the Fiji
Broadcasting Commission of being anti-Federation.100
As offensive to the Federation as the comments by Jakeway were, they were
tame compared to comments in May 1965 by Apisai Tora, who publically called for a
commission to look into the potential of ejecting the Indian population from Fiji.
Using Burma and Ceylon as examples, he stated, “If Fiji’s and Fijian interests are to
be protected then the quickest possible way should be found to send the Indians to
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other countries.”101 Beyond the intransigence and offensive nature of this statement,
Tora proclaimed his distrust in Indians while proclaiming affinity towards Europeans.
He called for the exclusion of Indians in the constitutional conference. He commented,
“We know the Europeans and we can get along with them. We also know what they
will advocate for in the coming London conference. As for the Indians, we do not
know what they want or what they are going to say in London. They are keeping
quiet, and we don’t like it.”102 Despite deep misgivings, and the ongoing boycott of
informal talks, discussion continued between the leadership of the Fijian political
parties and the Federation. Negotiations leading to the constitutional conference
illuminated communal divisions.
The constitutional conference opened in London on July 26, 1965.103
Although independence was excluded from consideration, the Fijian and Indian
positions on independence could not be fully avoided. After all, one of the essential
goals of the conference was to assist Fiji in moving towards internal self-governance.
Although mentioned previously, the definition of self-governance depended on the
person using it. Patel, representing the Federation, viewed the conference as a vehicle
for creating momentum towards Fijian independence. The level of self-governance
sought by Patel and the rest of the Indian contingent was clearly articulated by Patel:
“The constitution should empower the local government to conclude trade agreements
with other countries and provide for further delegations of authority to be made by the
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British government.”104 The Indian delegation pushed for more authority on faster
timelines than the Fijian delegation was prepared to accept.
The Fijian stance on moving towards self-governance was much more muted
by comparison. Ratu Mara, representing Fijians, stated, “We have declared that
independence is not our goal because we have never found any sound or valid reason
to attenuate, let alone abandon, our historical and happy association with the United
Kingdom.”105 For Europeans and Fijians in Fiji, the conference might at best be used
for modest movements toward self-governance, but the radical changes advocated by
Patel were not desired at the time of the conference. Fijian delegates viewed Indian
pressure to move quickly into independence as a way for the Indian community to
politically subjugate Fijians.
In a clear message that internal self-governance would be delayed, delegates
agreed to a compromise where the Crown would continue to appoint the Governor of
Fiji.106 In practical terms, the agreement rejected the Indian delegates proposals for
immediate internal self-governance. The British Governor represented a continuation
of external power over Fiji. However, while the Crown retained authority to appoint
the Governor, there were other changes that demonstrated shifts in the power
structures of Fiji’s government. The new constitution limited the power of the
Governor in appointments. The Governor lost all authority to appoint unofficials to
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the Legislative Council.107 While the make-up of the Legislative council was changed
in favor of elected officials, the nature of the communal voting changed as well.
The Legislative Council would be expanded to thirty-six members. Of those,
nine would be communally elected Fijians with an additional two Fijians appointed
by the Great Council of Chiefs. For the first time, Rotumans and Pacific Islanders
other than Fijians would be included in the Fijian communal vote. The Indian
communal delegation in the Legislative Council would consist of nine elected
members. The European communal delegation would grow to seven members and
would include the Chinese and other various communities not aligned with the Fijian
community for purposes of franchise. Thus, the communally elected members of the
Legislative Council would total twenty-seven. Beyond the communally elected
members there would be an additional nine members elected through a compromise
method of cross-voting in three constituencies.108 Thus, the racial make-up of the
Legislative Council would be fourteen Fijians, twelve Indians, and ten Europeans.109
The constitutional conference delegates in London introduced aspects of common roll
voting in hopes of politically integrating the entire population of Fiji, but at the same
time the communal voting rolls were freshly infused with new aspects of racial
division.
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The final make-up of the Legislative Council was a compromise between the
Indian call for full and immediate implementation of common roll voting and the
combined Fijian/European call for continued communal roll voting. Common roll
voting might have all but guaranteed an Indian majority in the Legislative Council, so
it is no surprise that it was rejected in favor of continued communal roll. The system
of cross-voting and communal voting was opposed by the Indian delegation, but what
was most upsetting to the delegation was the increased representation of Fijians in the
Legislative Council. The first argument utilized by the Fijian and European
delegations was that “the additional representation was justified by the special
position occupied by the Fijian community in Fiji.”110 The second argument for
granting Fijians two more seats than Indians was the inclusion of Rotumans and
Pacific Islanders in the Fijian communal representation.111 The Indian population
viewed this second argument with suspicion. At the end of 1965, the Indians
comprised 50.08% of the population while combined the Fijians, Rotumans, and
Pacific Islanders comprised just 44.31%.112 The Fijian delegation, with the support of
the European delegation managed to increase communal representation in the
Legislative Council. With negotiations on representation completed, the conference
attendees turned their attention to securing rights for their respective communities.
Delegates at the conference attempted to ensure that those they represented
would be protected in a Bill of Rights. Like other proposals at the conference, support
for aspects of the Bill of rights fell along communal lines. The Indian delegates
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objected to exclusions to freedom from discrimination. Freedom from discrimination
was accompanied with a policy whereby current laws that dictated discrimination
would not be immediately nullified. Instead, freedom from discrimination meant that
new discrimination could not be introduced into law, nor could it be reintroduced if
the current legal discrimination were reduced or eliminated.113 The Indian delegation
protested that current laws approving discrimination should be voided with the
introduction of the constitution, or at the very least a sunset provision should be
included that would grant a limited timeframe before the laws were nullified. This
sunset provision would not prevent nullification of discriminatory practices if
repealed by the government prior to the official sunset. These proposals for
immediate end to discrimination were rejected by the Fijian delegation, but the intent
to eliminate discriminatory laws was retained and agreed to by the Fijian, Indian, and
European delegations.114
During the conference, the Indian contingent attempted to use the process to
gain momentum towards independence while the European and Fijian contingents
worked to stall that very same momentum. The result appeared to favor the Fijian and
European communities since the Fijian community had picked up more seats in the
Legislative Council, maintained two positions nominated by the Great Council of
Chiefs, and reduced the potential of common roll voting to influence future elections.
The process of communal negotiations confirmed communal divisions within Fiji’s
political structure, but more than that, the conference expanded division by increasing
Fijian representation, as a ratio of total representatives in the Legislative Council, and
113
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confirming existing discriminatory laws aimed at the Indian population. The new
constitution became official on September 23, 1966 in advance of the elections,
which would begin just three days later on September 26, 1966.115
Amongst changes that confronted voters were an expanded Legislative
Council, a new confusing cross-voting system, and the removal of literacy as a
requirement for voting.116 The complexity of electing representatives was not lost on
the editors of the Fiji Times. Letters to the editor elucidated the voter confusion with
the new voting procedures. Lindsay Verrier, an European Alliance candidate in the
Northern Eastern Cross Voting constituency, wrote to the Fiji Times, “But in the Suva
General Constituency there will be three vacancies; so, if there are five candidates
here, I will wish to support three of them, and reject the other two. I must therefore be
given three General votes in the Suva Constituency where I reside. Similarly, voters
in the West Viti Levu General Constituency will have to exercise two votes each.”117
Verrier’s letter illustrated the general confusion regarding voting procedures
throughout Fiji in the September 1966 election. On July 8, 1966 the editor of the Fiji
Times confirmed to the readers that the regulations stipulated that each voter was only
permitted to return one vote in constituencies with multiple representatives. This
would create a situation where the top three candidates receiving individual votes
would be elected. The editor complained this was an unfair method of electing
multiple representatives since the likely scenario to play out would be overwhelming
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support to the most popular candidate and exceptionally underwhelming support to
other candidates. High levels of support for the most popular candidate would create
an illusion of non-support for qualified candidates who, being elected with very low
tallies, were still likely to have significant support in their own rights. The most
popular candidate would then have the appearance of more political capital than they
actually obtain in the election.118 By July 30 the issue of single votes for multiple
representatives had been resolved and voters were to be given the opportunity to vote
for all of their representatives, but other issues continued to come to the forefront;
specifically, on the boundaries of constituencies for communal and cross-voting
purposes.119 Voters, having the opportunity to vote once for each eligible vacancy in
their respective constituency, were more likely to vote outside of their own racial
category. Candidates in the cross-voting districts had to appeal to all voters along
political ideological lines instead of racial lines. Integrating voters was one of the
goals of the new constitution and it seemed to be working.
August 12 marked the final day for candidates to register for the Legislative
Council election. In all, the Alliance and Federation parties nominated eighty-four
candidates to fill thirty-four seats in the Legislative Council. The communal
breakdown was twenty-eight Fijian candidates for twelve communal seats; thirty-five
Indian candidates for twelve communal seats; and twenty-one candidates for ten
General Elector seats.120 The Federation and Alliance put forward three female
candidates: Irene Narayan (Suva, Indian), Margaret Bain (Suva, General) and Loloma
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Livingston (Western Cross-Voting, General).121 Narayan ran as the Federation Party
candidate facing off against Andrew Deoki, a veteran politician who was viewed by
Federation Party leadership as a significant critic of Patel and the party. By putting up
a relatively unknown female candidate against Deoki, Patel reasoned that Deoki
might be more vulnerable to electoral defeat. That gamble paid off when Narayan
trounced Deoki by a tally of 5,676 to 2,779, which allowed Patel to continue
solidifying the Federation’s hold on Indian representation in the Legislative
Council.122
Leading up to the elections, the Fiji Times, the English language newspaper
published in the capitol city of Suva, published a variety of articles and editorials
intended to educate voters. As such, the newspaper was often accused of being proFijian and British. The Federation Party accused the Fiji Times of being antiFederation.123 Evidence of the pro-Alliance bias was plainly available to any reader of
the paper on September 13, when the editors claimed that “the simple situation facing
voters at this month’s elections is that only through electing the candidates selected
by The Alliance, or those willing to work in close and loyal harmony with The
Alliance for the benefit of the whole Colony, can Fiji be assured of such a
government because, as Ratu Mara said, no others have offered or even prepared, ‘a
programme of government’ for the Colony.”124 The claim made by Ratu Mara,
leading the Alliance Party, that nobody else had offered alternate solutions was
disingenuous since it completely ignored the campaigns of the Federation. A
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newspaper endorsing the positions of certain candidates and parties is hardly
surprising in an editorial section, but the strength of the statement created doubts
among members of the Federation in the newspaper’s ability to report straight news
related to the election.
Despite the noticeable affirmations of pro-Fijian and British attitudes, the Fiji
Times published candidate biographical sketches with accompanying photographs of
each candidate throughout the months leading up to the elections in an ongoing
section entitled “Election Who’s Who” beginning on August 24.125 Alternately, the
newspaper published another regular section entitled, “What the Candidates Say” to
provide candidates an opportunity to write out their positions and make their pitch
directly to voters. Federation Party candidates generally did not put forth statements
for inclusion in the Fiji Times.126 The Federation held a deep distrust in the Fiji Times
going back to the pre-constitutional conference negotiations. This distrust reduced the
available platforms to reach out to voters across the racial divide in the cross-voting
constituencies. Even though the Federation did not take advantage of the opportunity
afforded by the Fiji Times, there were Indian politicians outside of the party that took
advantage. Jaswant Singh, and Indian member of the Alliance Party, ran for the West
Viti Levu Indian communal seat. In his statement, Singh declared that as a member of
the Alliance he would follow the policy statements put forth by the Alliance. He
supported the concept of Fiji as a homeland for ethnic Indians, and as such supported
more open talks “with the other races.” He also broke with Federation Party over the
immediate application of common roll voting, supporting a slower approach to
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bringing about that change.127 Singh’s position of slowly rolling out common roll
voting was tied to the idea that if common roll voting were immediately applied it
was likely that the Fijian population would not accept the results if the Legislative
Council was dominated by Indians. This would pose more problems for Indians and
Fijians than it could possibly solve. Thus, slowly applying the principles of common
roll voting would slowly integrate the population rather than rush an integration that
could create a backlash into worse racial relations.
Singh illustrated that the Indian community was not completely unified behind
the Federation Party. The Alliance was not entirely composed of non-Indians,
whereas the Federation was an Indian party. Koya, the Federation candidate, solidly
defeated Singh by a tally of 6,318 to 2,221.128 Patel was then able to control Indian
representation in the Legislative Council and was appointed as “Leader of the
Opposition.”129 The elections of 1966 solidified the Federation as the Indian party. In
two high profile constituencies, the Federation overcame challenges to their claim to
represent Indian political interests. Ratu Mara became Fiji’s Chief Minister because
the Alliance picked up a majority of seats in the Legislative Council and filled out the
new Cabinet style of government. The two parties solidified their grip on the political
identity of their respective communities by demonstrating their electoral appeal.
However, while electoral politics strengthened the parties grip on communal politics,
external events drove a wedge between the communities.
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The United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (commonly
referred to as the Committee of 24), established in 1962 to implement the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, set its sights on
colonial Fiji.130 The Fiji Times ran an editorial on August 16, 1966 responding to the
Committee’s potential of a fact-finding mission. Ostensibly, the purpose of the visit
was to gather information regarding the committee’s draft resolution calling for
independence and common roll voting in Fiji. The editorial reported incredulously,
“The implication seems to be that the poor, downtrodden, people of Fiji are so
oppressed by Britain that they are unable to appeal to their saviours — from, of all
places, Tanzania, Syria and Bulgaria. People living in Fiji will find it hard to believe
that anyone could be so divorced from reality, but such is the fantasy in which this
United Nations committee lives.”131 Fijian and European political leaders in Fiji
viewed the committee as unfitting to condemn the government of Fiji because of the
current and recent experiences of the countries that made up the committee.
India, Tunisia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Madagascar, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and
Ethiopia sponsored the resolution.132 The first country listed as sponsoring the
resolution in the UN gave pause to Fijian and European politicians. India was calling
for independence and a common roll vote in solidarity with the Indian political party
of Fiji. The draft resolution echoed the Federation’s platform in many ways. While
India had previously been involved in supporting Indians in other colonial contexts
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before, in Fiji the Indian population was in the majority. The Fijian fear of an Indian
dominated Fiji now had to contend with the potential for direct external support for
Indians within Fiji.
Despite full-throated support of the resolution from India’s delegates, it was
John Male, the delegate from Tanzania who officially proposed the resolution.133
Once again, the Fiji Times called into question where the UN delegates from India
were getting their information related to Fiji, especially since the Alliance leadership
suspected that it was India’s delegates pushing the draft resolution. “It would be
useful to be told where the New Delhi spokesman gets his inspiration, though much
of the twaddle presented to the committee has an extraordinarily familiar ring to
people who have been subjected to the harangues of various local demagogues in
Fiji.”134 The newspaper expressed what Fijian and European leaders suspected.
Without an explicit accusation, the author of the editorial accused Indian political
leaders of attempting to use the United Nations to achieve what they were unable to
accomplish through negotiations at the constitutional conference the year prior.
Ratu Mara, on behalf of the Alliance, accused the Federation of inviting
outside interference in Fijian political matters, sowing the seeds of discord and
encouraging hatred. In a broadcast speech in Fiji on September 23, 1966, He stated,
“But, let me say this clearly, there will be no welcome in Fiji for ignorant and illdisposed interference in our affairs from outside.”135 Ratu Mara addressed what he
viewed as the potential for UN meddling, but Patel was the intended target. Later in
133
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the same speech, Mara said, “We know, for instance, that British Guiana was a
peaceful country till one politician and his followers at a general election told his
supporters to vote only for candidates of their own race. The evil seeds of racism
were then sown in the policies of that country, bringing misery, fear and death to
hundreds of its people and near ruin to its economy.”136 Mara’s words, clearly
associated with Patel, betrayed the policies that Mara himself had advocated. Just
one-year prior, it was Mara and the other Fijian delegates that advocated for retaining
communal voting. It was not the Federation that advocated voting based strictly on
communal category; it was the Alliance.
The Committee of 24 passed the resolution calling for common roll voting and
the establishment of a date for independence, with a final tally of twenty in favor
against three opposed. Great Britain, the United States, and Australia opposed the
resolution claiming to represent the majority consensus of Fijians.137 Frederick Lee,
the last Secretary of State for the Colonies, simply said, “We are not in any way
bound to honour the committee’s resolutions. We think they lack experience and
knowledge, and therefore, because we think they are not doing any particularly good
service, we rather believe the thing to do is to go on in the way we are going…”138
Despite the vote of the committee, it was manifestly apparent that the British had no
intention of complying. The result of the resolution was the retention of the status quo
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constitutionally, but debates in the UN and in Fiji regarding the resolution called into
sharp contrast communal politics in Suva. The Federation, representing the Indian
community, continued its calls for common roll voting and independence, a set of
policies that aligned with the Committee of 24. The Alliance, representing Fijian
interests, considered the resolution to be a challenge to Fijian control of Fiji. An
immediate move to common roll voting and independence would have meant
forgoing all of the advantages the Fijian community secured in the constitutional
conference.
Following the elections of 1963 political leaders in Fiji’s Legislative Council
began negotiations for a constitutional conference to be held in London. The
contentious negotiations clarified the communal divide in Fiji. After negotiations
were concluded in Fiji, the constitutional conference began in London. The
agreement forged in the constitutional conference further codified communal division.
When voters went to the polls in late 1966 the result was solidified political identities
as the communal vote results went straight down party lines. Federation candidates
won all of the available communal Indian seats while the Alliance did the same for
Fijian seats. While the elections firmed up communal support along party lines in Fiji,
activities outside of Fiji also affected political division. The UN Committee of 24
voted for a resolution that supported the Federation’s call for common roll voting and
a set date for independence. Ratu Mara viewed A.D. Patel with suspicion, accusing
him of exciting trouble in Fiji on behalf of the Indian population. Regardless of the
suspicions that existed between the two men, the constitution was designed to ensure
communal division within the Legislative Council.
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CHAPTER 3. CONCEALING COMMUNAL DIVISION TO OBTAIN
INDEPENDENCE

The 1966 elections were followed by a period of political calm in Fiji as the
leaders of the Alliance and Federation adjusted to their new roles in the newly formed
government. The Alliance formed the majority government while the Federation took
its place as the Opposition party. By January of 1970 Fiji, both parties focused on the
next leap in constitutional change, independence. Both the Alliance and Federation
concluded that it was preferable to proceed towards “Dominion Status” rather than to
remain in the colonial status that the Fijian political leadership had advocated for just
a few years prior.139 Despite agreeing to proceed toward Dominion Status with
membership in the Commonwealth, the old conflicts of electoral methodology
remained along with the paramountcy claims of the Fijian people.140
Siddiq Koya, the Federation vice-president took over as the leader of the
Federation Party in October 1969. Under Koya’s leadership, the Federation renewed
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talks with the Alliance to advance Fijian independence.141 These discussions
culminated in a joint statement by Koya and Ratu Mara on January 17, 1970:
“Inter-party discussions have led to the point where it is agreed that
Fiji should proceed to Dominion Status. Following on this agreement
we have invited Lord Shepherd to visit Fiji as soon as convenient to
acquaint himself at first hand with the position. It is our intention that
we reach Dominion Status as soon as possible without fresh elections
being held beforehand and we will in due course introduce a motion in
the Legislative Council to formalise this request.”142
The joint statement indicated a desire for a speedy conclusion to British governance
over Fiji. To accomplish that, both parties were willing to forgo elections. In effect
Koya and Mara announced that they were now prepared to negotiate the future of Fiji
without direct influence from London. Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, accepted the invitation and arrived in Fiji January 26,
departing ten days later on February 3.143
The Federation continued advocating for a fully independent Fiji, including an
elected President as head of state, but accepted the compromise of remaining within
the Commonwealth. Accepting Dominion Status was a compromise though not a
significant loss to Indian goals of independence. While the Federation’s position
remained relatively unchanged, the Alliance had shifted its platform. Instead of
remaining as a colony, the Alliance proposed Dominion Status with the Queen as the
head of state.144 The change in party platform came on the heels of Alliance control of
the government for three years, and the party perceived that the time was right to
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move towards self-government while retaining control. Under the current political
situation, Fijians would control Fiji for the foreseeable future.
The speed of progress towards independence surprised many observers.145
Shepherd briefly commented on the issue of paramountcy, a specific concern that had
previously caused consternation. Negotiators representing the Federation and
Alliance agreed that a reference would be made to the Deed of Cession in the
preamble to the constitution.146 The Fijian claim to paramountcy was largely based on
the Deed of Cession. British policy throughout the history of the colony had placed
the Fijian community at the forefront, but in referencing the Deed of Cession in the
preamble, there was a significant risk of alienating the Indian community. This
decision, agreed to by Indian negotiators, effectively entrenched the position of the
Indian community as secondary to the Fijian community. Political expediency on
behalf of the Indian negotiators might explain why they were willing to accept the
situation. Indians remained in the majority and following eventual independence the
constitution could be altered to rectify any agreements that were made in advance.
The constitutional conference to set the conditions for independence opened
April 20, 1970 and ran through May 5, 1970.147 The opening speeches of the
conference in London illustrated an impressive level of verbal acrobatics from all
three of the major leaders. Shepherd extolled the advancement of tolerance in Fiji
stating, “The peoples of Fiji have surmounted those problems in remarkable degree.
Their racial tolerance and mutual understanding, their ability to live together in
145

FIJI INDEPENDENCE BILL; HL Deb 21 July 1970 vol 311, p 881.
Report of the Fiji Constitutional Conference 1970. 32.
147
FIJI: PROPOSED INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION; HL Deb 07 May 1970
vol 310 cc400-2WA
146

52
goodwill, have placed them in high regard among their friends and neighbours in the
world.”148 The idea that tolerance was a reality in Fiji ignored the continued political
isolation enshrined by communal roll voting and the continued economic isolation
whereby Fijians communally owned the overwhelming majority of land while Indians,
unable to own land, possessed the majority of leases. His opening speech was much
rosier than the speeches that followed.
Ratu Mara followed Shepherd saying, “It will be a measure of the success of
this Conference if the Constitution we finally approve will enable us to create a Fiji
where people of different races, opinions and cultures can live and work together for
the good of all; can differ without rancour, govern without violence, and accept
responsibility as reasonable people intent on serving the best interests of all.”149
Mara’s comments, aimed at Koya and the opposition party, were at best disingenuous.
Mara, just four years prior, accused Patel and the Federation of stirring up trouble that
would lead to violence. His comments regard working together for the benefit of all
residents of Fiji while steering clear of the topic of unity. Mara’s goals were couched
in negative terms. Communal differentiation remained an accepted part of his plans
for governance in Fiji, communal groups working together without becoming a
unified nationality.
Koya also addressed the issue of race during his opening speech saying that
“it behooves therefore all of us to see that the new Constitution is one which will
expressly and/or by clear implication guide the people of Fiji to unite rather than
divide. It should produce conditions which would be conducive to and consistent with
148
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the making of the country into one nation and one people.”150 Koya’s speech
indicated a desire to create a single nationality in Fiji. Throughout the previous
constitutional negotiations, the Federation had argued that the best way to achieve
unity in Fiji was through common roll. Of course, the unity that Koya called for
would likely have led to a Federation, and therefore by default an Indian, led
government in Fiji.
In an address to the House of Lords following the Conference, Shepherd
commented on the speed at which Fiji’s communal divisions had been ameliorated.
He said that after the contentious nature of the previous constitutional conference in
1965 “it is hard to believe that some five years later we should be considering an
Independence 882 Bill for Fiji.”151 According to Shepherd, he was warned that
moving Fiji to independence was “premature.” Despite those cautions, he undertook
the trip to Fiji to begin negotiating with the Federation and Alliance. He claimed that
during his visit he “did not feel any sense of racial tension. I found an Indian
Commissioner, or a Commissioner of Indian origin, acting in a totally Fijian district,
with no problems at all. It was perhaps as a consequence of that, more than as a
consequence of the assurances that I received from the political leaders, that I felt that
it was right that Fiji should proceed to independence.”152 It is not surprising then to
see that Shepherd’s visit did not illuminate racial divisions. He was invited to Fiji in a
joint effort by the Federation and Alliance to be shown that Fiji was ready for
independence. Both parties had reasons for desiring independence and both
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understood that to move in the direction of independence Shepherd had to be
convinced of communal harmony. The Federation viewed this trip as an opportunity
to move forward with their desire for an independent Fiji, while the Alliance saw
independence as a chance to consolidate political power through a Fijian controlled
Fijian government without direct British oversight.
As Fiji raced towards Independence on October 10, 1970, the world either
appeared to believe racial harmony had been broken out in Fiji, or was willing to
suspend disbelief based on the previous decade of political clashes to get to the
desired end, regardless of what would come post independence. The New York Times
commented on the apparent breakout of cordiality in Fiji. An article appeared on
March 23, 1970 entitled, “Sudden Racial Harmony on Fiji Speeds Plan for
Independence.”153 The Fiji Times noted in an editorial on April 18, 1970, that a
“climate of goodwill now prevails throughout Fiji and there are no signs that it will
not continue.”154 Fijian and Indian leaders saw communal division as an obstacle to
their goals of consolidating power through independence.
Regardless of what was happening with communal divisions below the
surface, if Fijians wanted independence they had only to ask for it. A Fiji Times
editor sought to counter the suggestion by the Soviet delegate to the UN that Fiji’s
independence had been “clear evidence of the ‘incomparable struggle’ against
colonialism.” Rather, according to the editor, Fiji was a unique case in the recent
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history of the British Empire in which there was no struggle, only a simple request
from Fijians to which Britain acquiesced to without much difficulty.155
Not everyone was convinced by the show of harmony in Fiji. Australia
controlled seventy percent of Fiji’s economic interests. As seen in a classified
evaluation of Fiji, the government in Canberra remained concerned over racial and
ethnic tensions in Fiji.156 So long as Koya and Mara could maintain their close
relationship, racial harmony was expected to continue, though the prospects were not
very great. Mara was described as being “moody, proud, and sensitive to criticism.”
He was also “liable to over-react to anything he could perceive as a personal
slight.”157 One key to watch, according to the National Intelligence Committee (NIC),
which produced the report, was the willingness of Mara to use violence against
Indians.158 Koya, on the other hand was evaluated as having “strong personality and a
political history of excitability and outspokenness.”159 Communal harmony depended
on these two men and their ability to continue their commitment to harmony.
The appearance of harmony covered tensions just long enough to rush into
independence on the 96th anniversary of the signing of the Deed of Cession. Indeed,
the rapidity of the process excluded the potential for fresh elections, or even
consideration for how representation in the legislature would be determined. It was in
the interest of both major political parties to gain independence, but for different
reasons. The Alliance, controlling the government, saw an opportunity to retake Fiji
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for Fijians. Independence therefore was an opportunity to solidify their position going
into the future. The Federation had supported independence from the beginning of the
party. For it, independence was an opportunity to exploit demographic dominance
and reverse the political control of Fijians. Thus, even the constitutional changes
leading to independence were driven in large part by communal division despite the
opposite public commentary.
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CONCLUSION

The Burns and Spate reports created the foundation for a decade of change in
Fiji. Critically, their reports recommended the eventual absolution of the Fijian
Adminsitration. The practical result of that would have been to reduce communal
isolation in Fiji. This threatened the Fijian Council of Chiefs who advocated for
strengthened control of Fijians through continued cultural isolation. In 1963, the
Great Council of Chiefs suffered a blow to their authority when Fijians obtained the
right to vote for three of their representatives on the Legislative Council. Despite
losing some control over the Legislative Council representatives, the communal roll
aspect of voting in Fiji ensured that Fijians would continue to politically support only
Fijians. Similarly, Indians could only vote for Indians and Europeans for Europeans.
After the elections, the Indian representatives in the Legislative Council combined
disparate, local, Indian political parties to create the first colony-wide political party
as a communally based party. The Fijians followed suit a few years later. Isolation
between the communal groups began to fade, but political isolation remained the
norm as their communal groups identified residents of Fiji politically.
In 1965 London held a constitutional conference to move Fiji towards selfgovernance. Contentious negotiations marred the lead up to the conference. While,
communal roll voting continued, one major change permitted cross voting in some
constituencies. This was a compromise with the Indian call for common roll voting.
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Both Indian and Fijian negotiators argued for policies that would strengthen their
position within the Fijian government. The resulting constitution ensured that Fijians
would obtain a majority in the 1966 election cycle. Indeed, when the votes were
tallied in 1966, the Alliance created the new government with the Federation as the
Opposition. Notably, the Federation retained the position of the political party that
represented Indians, defeating all communal challengers. While Indian negotiators
failed to obtain their goals of common roll voting and independence, the Committee
of 24 echoed their calls through a UN resolution. That the resolution aligned so
closely with the Federation’s platform only reinforced divisions between the political
leaders of Fiji. The constitutional conference codified communal division in the
Legislative Council, and the elections solidified communal support for the developing
political parties in Fiji.
Communal division was an obstacle in the way of Fijian independence. By
the beginning of 1970, the Alliance had been in power for three years. The
constitution seemingly ensured continued Fijian dominance of the Legislative
Council and so independence with Fijian control of Fiji was a realistic proposal. The
Federation’s platform still called for immediate independence along with common
roll voting. Common roll voting was still farther than the Alliance would accept, but
both communal parties now accepted independence as the next step. The only
obstacle in the way was British concerns over communal division and strife. To
overcome this difficulty, the leaders of the Alliance and Federation joined together in
a joint statement and orchestrated a visit for Shepard to demonstrate a harmonious
Fiji. The efforts worked well enough to secure independence for Fiji. Communal
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divisions were concealed to obtain a common goal, but the reality was that communal
division and distrust was still active.
On October 10, 1970 Fiji took its independence with a Fijian controlled
legislature. The constitution of 1966 had all but guaranteed that result, and the goal of
the Alliance to maintain a Fiji controlled by Fijians appeared to be secure. However,
just seven years later during the 1977 elections, the National Federation Party won
half of the seats in the House of Representatives. The Indian party did not act quickly
enough to set up a government, and so the governor then asked the Alliance to set up
a temporary government until new elections could be held. The result of the second
election put the Alliance back in control by a firm majority once more returning the
government to indigenous Fijian control. By 1987 the political situation had improved
for the National Federation Party when it formed a coalition government with the Fiji
Labour Party, a class based party.160 This time Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka
initiated a military coup at 10:00 AM, May 14, 1987.161 Three more coups occurred
over the next twenty years.162 The impacts of communal division in Fijian elections
lasted into the twenty-first century.
Isolation dominated communal relations in Fiji from the beginning of the
colony, but as the 1960’s proceeded, isolation gave way to more regular interactions.
One place these interactions took place was in the Legislative Council where Fijians,
Indians, and Europeans were represented. Communal voting ensured that residents of
Fiji were represented, but it also ensured that issues dealt with in the Council were
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considered based on communal advantage. The constitution assured communal
isolation by defining the community in which a voter belonged, but it was the
elections that defined communal, political identity. The success of the burgeoning
political parties made certain that communal identity was more important than
political ideology or economic class in determining representation in the Legislative
Council. Ultimately, in the political sphere, communal isolation gave way to political
identity based on communal division.
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